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Robust Image Watermarking Using Non-Regular Wavelets
Renato J. Cintra∗ and Todor V. Cooklev†
Abstract
An approach to watermarking digital images using non-regular wavelets is advanced. Non-regular
transforms spread the energy in the transform domain. The proposed method leads at the same time
to increased image quality and increased robustness with respect to lossy compression. The approach
provides robust watermarking by suitably creating watermarked messages that have energy compaction
and frequency spreading. Our experimental results show that the application of non-regular wavelets,
instead of regular ones, can furnish a superior robust watermarking scheme. The generated watermarked
data is more immune against non-intentional JPEG and JPEG2000 attacks.
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1 Introduction
Digital watermarking of images has been an active area of research for over a decade. The main objec-
tives of watermarking are to protect the ownerships of the host images and to preserve their authenticities.
Watermarking techniques have also been applied in areas as diverse as data hiding [1], biomedical signal pro-
cessing [2,3], image indexing [4], image hashing [5], and broadcast monitoring [6]. The two main requirements
are that watermarks be imperceptible and robust against lossy signal processing. Watermarking methods
that are not robust against lossy signal processing are called fragile [7]. In principle, robust watermarking
is performed by inserting a hidden message — the watermark — into a host image, such that the hidden
message can survive different types of attacks such as compression, resizing, filtering, re-scanning, or printing.
Detection algorithms are used to retrieve the watermark from watermarked messages [8]. The robustness of
a watermarking algorithm is measured by the ability to detect successfully the watermark after an attack.
Early watermarking algorithms used spatial domain techniques which insert watermarked messages into
the spatial domain of the host images [9]. Generally, inserted messages were pseudorandom sequences
similar to the sequences found in spread spectrum techniques used in wireless communications systems [10].
Pseudorandom messages could be obtained by first creating an 1-D random message with length equal to the
number of columns. Then this random message was circularly shifted with random phase shift for each row.
Mainly, the watermark could be detected using correlation techniques. Block-based 2-D signal processing
could also be used [11]. Because spread-spectrum pseudo-noise contains high frequency components, the
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robustness of spatial techniques are sensitive to compression and lowpass filters. Nevertheless, it continues
to find recent applications [12].
Another possible venue is the insertion of the watermark into the spectral domain of the subject data.
There are approaches that embed the watermark in the low-frequency subbands to improve the robustness
against a variety of attacks, e.g. lowpass filtering and compression. Several transform techniques have
been employed to fulfill this purpose. Among them, the discrete Fourier transform, the discrete cosine
transform, and a number of wavelet transforms deserve mention. However, current investigations in this
area significantly embrace the application of wavelets. Publications [13–16] describe several wavelet domain
watermarking methods and include comparisons.
In this paper, we propose a new watermarking technique that is based on non-regular wavelet transforms.
The application of non-regular transforms to image processing is novel. Our experimental results show that
non-regular transforms are superior to regular transforms for robust watermarking purposes. The reason
that non-regular wavelet filters are more robust is that they offer energy spreading, while regular wavelet
filters offer energy concentration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents non-regular discrete wavelet transforms (DWT)
and a watermarking method using non-regular wavelets is proposed in Section 3. In Section 4, a statistical
method for watermarking detection is elaborated. Computational experiments and discussions are presented
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the obtained results.
2 Non-regular Discrete Wavelet Transforms
Frequently, wavelet generation is based on filter bank methods. Filter banks that perform DWT have always
been designed so that in addition to perfect reconstruction the filters have in some sense good frequency
responses, e.g. in two-channel transforms H0(z) has always been required to be a good lowpass filter and
H1(z) — to be a good highpass filter. Good lowpass and highpass filters have the energy compaction
property. Provided that H0(z) is regular, iterative algorithms for wavelet generation converge and smooth
functions can be obtained [17]. If H0(z) is non-regular, then iterative processes fail to converge [18]. For
example, complementary or Golay-Rudin-Shapiro (GRS) polynomials, which have coefficients equal to +1
or −1 [19], can be utilized to design non-regular wavelet filters. Two polynomials, H00(z) and H01(z), each
with l coefficients, are complementary if
H00(z)H00(z
−1) +H01(z)H01(z
−1) = 2l. (1)
Then the filter pair H0(z) = H00(z
2) + z−1H01(z
2), and H1(z) = −z
−NH0(−z
−1) defines an orthogonal
wavelet transform. In particular, the non-regular filters h0 =
[
1 1 1 −1
]
and h1 =
[
−1 −1 1 −1
]
,
called here GRS4 filters, have frequency responses as shown in Figure 1. For instance, this pair of filters induce
the generation of the GRS4 wavelets. It is worth to note that these filters do not offer energy compaction,
but offer energy spreading. Starting from a kernel with four coefficients, other wavelet filters can be obtained
recursively. These non-regular filters have been used in other communications applications [20], where energy
spreading is desirable.
Unlike regular filters, when non-regular filters are used, a given signal and its DWT share similar statistical
properties. To illustrate this, Figure 2(a) shows the Lena image in the spatial domain, as well as in the
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Figure 1: Magnitude response of the GRS4 filter pair: H0 (solid line) and H1 (dashed line).
Table 1: The average Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD) among selected original images and their GRS4
DWT subbands, respectively
JSD (×10−2) Original LL LH HL HH
Original 0 - - - -
LL 3.2014 0 - - -
LH 2.5290 0.7972 0 - -
HL 2.3966 0.9731 0.2843 0 -
HH 2.6530 2.5759 0.8467 0.6518 0
transform domain furnished by the GRS4 wavelet (Figure 2(b)). Clearly, the non-regular transform spreads
the energy in all subbands. In Figure 2(c) and (d), histograms of the original image and the GRS4 DWT
subbands are depicted, exhibiting noticeable visual similarity. In order to quantify this behavior, techniques
for measuring the statistical proximity between two probability distributions were considered. A useful
tool for this purpose is the Jensen-Shannon divergence [21]. This particular divergence is based on the
Kullback-Leibler divergence [22].
Extensive computer simulations have been performed with 20 different test images from the USC-SIPI
image database [23]. Then the Jensen-Shannon divergence among each image and its GRS4 DWT subbands
was calculated. Table 1 shows the average of the obtained values for the Jensen-Shannon divergence. Note
that the distances are extremely small, clearly indicating a high statistical proximity among the examined
images and their GRS4 DWT subbands. Other GRS wavelets also offer comparable results.
The energy spreading property of the non-regular filter banks explains the obtained statistical similarities.
In fact, this information theoretical proximity between spatial and transform domains is explored to propose
a new robust watermarking scheme.
3 Image Watermarking Using Non-regular DWT
The block diagram of the proposed watermarking algorithm is shown in Figure 3. The scheme includes three
generic steps: watermark insertion, attack, and detection. The watermark insertion begins by computing
3
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Figure 2: (a) Original image, (b) subbands of the decomposed image, (c) histogram of the original image,
and (d) histogram of each subband, respectively.
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Figure 3: Block diagram of the proposed watermarking scheme: (a) watermark insertion and attack, (b)
watermark detection.
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Figure 4: Quality Index vs. watermark strength for different wavelets: Daubechies-4 (×), Daubechies-8 (+),
Coiflet-6 (∗), biorthogonal 6/2 (), and GRS4 (◦). Watermark was inserted either in all subbands (dotted
lines), or only in the high subbands (solid lines).
the DWT of the input image to obtain the low-low (LL), low-high (LH), high-low (HL), and high-high (HH)
subbands. The watermark message is inserted in the wavelet domain by
Y = X+ αW, (2)
where Y is the watermarked data in transform domain, X is the wavelet transform of the original image I,
W is the watermark message, and α is a scalar value associated to the watermark strength. Usually, the
watermark can be embedded in all subbands except LL, or — as discussed here — when non-regular filters
are used, in all subbands, including LL. The size of the watermarking message is equal to the size of the
image when the watermark is embedded in all subbands. When the watermark is inserted in the LH, HL,
and HH subbands, the size of the watermarking message is equal to the combined size of these subbands.
The watermark strength α should be chosen to satisfy the two requirements of image quality and robustness.
The first requirement is that the watermarked image be indistinguishable from the original image. While
this can be verified subjectively using just-noticeable-difference [24], the quality of the watermarked image
can be calculated using the universal quality index (UQI) proposed in [25]. Although the UQI is not based
on any HVS model, it outperforms, for example the mean squared error and the peak signal-to-noise ratio,
as a measure of quality. It is accepted that a UQI value of 0.9 or greater generally indicates an imperceptibly
distorted image. Based on a set of twelve standard images available at the USC-SIPI image database [23], the
average UQI of the images as a function of the watermark strength α, for several wavelets with and without
using the subband LL, was calculated and shown in Figure 4. Therefore, a reliable range for the selection of
the watermark strength is α ≤ 3.5. Judiciously, α was set to three in all instances of this work. Figure 4 also
clearly indicates that non-regular filters lead to higher values of the universal quality index. Additionally,
when regular filters are used and the watermark is inserted in the LL subband, the image quality is lower,
as the watermark becomes noticeable. Posterior to the insertion of the watermark according to Equation 2,
the computation of the inverse DWT of Y furnished the watermarked image IW.
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In the next step, the watermarked image is submitted to non-intentional attacks, modeled by lossy signal
processing. Specifically, both JPEG and JPEG2000 compression schemes are employed. Unlike JPEG coding,
JPEG2000 is a wavelet based scheme. The compression attack can be recognized as an additive noise signal
V, which produces a corrupted image I′
W
= IW +V.
The final step consists of a statistical analysis aiming the estimation and detection of the watermark
message. The estimated watermark Wˆ is obtained using a non-blind approach, in which the original image
is required. After a forward DWT application on I′
W
, the quantityY′ is returned and the watermark message
is estimated by the following expression:
αWˆ = Y′ −X. (3)
Once the watermark message is estimated, it is necessary to establish whether it matches the authentic
watermark W. The detection phase is based on the correlation coefficient ρ between W and Wˆ. This
quantity is evaluated as follows
ρ =
〈W,Wˆ〉
‖W‖2‖Wˆ‖2
, (4)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the usual inner product and ‖ · ‖2 is the L
2 norm.
In this study, the watermarks were generated by random binary sequences of +1 and −1 with equal
probabilities. A same random message is added to each subband. Observe that, for a fixed image, each step
of the watermarking procedure is deterministic. Then, a suggested approach to investigate the behavior of ρ
is to perform the watermarking procedure employing different random watermarks. Therefore, the resulting
ρ becomes a random variable to be analyzed.
4 Detection Method
According to an observed value of ρ, a binary hypothesis test was taken in consideration attempting to decide
between the following two hypothesis: (i) the null hypothesis (H0), corresponding to the absence of a correct
watermark, and (ii) the alternative hypothesis (H1), implying the existence of a matching watermark. It is
worth to note that the complete absence of the watermark, i.e. W = 0, is categorized as a mismatch.
Using a conservative approach, a detector based on the Neyman-Pearson (NP) lemma was devised [26].
The NP lemma establishes a threshold based test that maximizes the probability of detection PD subject to
a prescribed probability of false alarm PFA. In symbols, for a given correlation coefficient ρ0, the decision
rule is to decide H1 if
L(ρ0) ,
p(ρ0;H1)
p(ρ0;H0)
> γ, (5)
otherwise, decide H0. The function L(·) is the likelihood ratio, p(·;H0) and p(·;H1) are the probability
density functions (pdfs) of ρ for each hypothesis, respectively, and the threshold γ is given by [26]
∫
{x:L(x)>γ}
p(x;H0)dx = PFA. (6)
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Figure 5: Selected 512×512 grayscale test images: (a) Mandrill, (b) Peppers, (c) Couple, (d) Aerial, (e)
Stream and bridge, (f) Car and APCs, (g) Fishing Boat, (h) Girl (Elaine), (i) Lena, (j) USC texture mosaic
#1, (k) Toy Vehicle, frame 1, and (l) Pixel ruler.
Unfortunately, the NP detector assumes that the pdfs of ρ, for each hypothesis, are known. However,
no analytical expressions for the above mentioned pdfs are available. Consequently, exhaustive numerical
simulations were performed to obtain the empirical pdfs of ρ, p′(ρ;H0) and p
′(ρ;H1), as approximations for
p(ρ;H0) and p(ρ;H1), respectively [27].
To compute the empirical pdfs of ρ, an initial set of twelve standard images available at the USC SIPI
database [23] was selected, as shown in Figure 5. Each image was submitted to the discussed watermarking
procedure. All the factors that contribute to the quantification of the response variable ρ were considered and,
in a sense, a factorial experiment was designed [28]. Several wavelets were employed, namely Daubechies-4,
Daubechies-8, Coiflet-6, biorthogonal 6/2, and GRS4, where the numbering indicates the size of the respective
filters. Also various degrees of attack were utilized. For the standard JPEG compression, the attack strength
can be measured by the JPEG quality factor Q, which is inversely proportional to the compression. The
selected quality factors were Q ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70, 90}. Similarly, for the JPEG2000 attack, a range of different
bit rates consisting of 0.25, 0.5, 1, and 2 bits per pixels (bpp) was monitored. After 300 trials for every
image, every wavelet, every type of attack, and every strength of attack, the obtained values of ρ constituted
a statistical sample used to derive the sought empirical pdfs.
The empirical pdfs for the JPEG attack at Q = 10 and Q = 90 are respectively displayed in Figures 6
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Figure 6: Empirical pdfs of ρ for the JPEG attack with quality factor of 10% under (a) null hypothesis with
W = 0, (b) null hypothesis with W 6= 0, and (c) alternative hypothesis.
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Figure 7: Empirical pdfs of ρ for the JPEG attack with quality factor of 90% under (a) null hypothesis with
W = 0, (b) null hypothesis with W 6= 0, and (c) alternative hypothesis.
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Figure 8: Empirical pdfs of ρ for the JPEG2000 attack at 0.25 bpp under (a) null hypothesis with W = 0,
(b) null hypothesis with W 6= 0, and (c) alternative hypothesis.
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Figure 9: Empirical pdfs of ρ for the JPEG2000 attack at 2 bpp under (a) null hypothesis with W = 0, (b)
null hypothesis with W 6= 0, and (c) alternative hypothesis.
Table 2: Average and standard deviation of the empirical pdf of ρ for several combinations of wavelets and
JPEG attack strength
Quality Factor
Wavelet
10 30 50 70 90
Daubechies-4 0.0276±0.0108 0.0952±0.0272 0.1604±0.0503 0.2529±0.0666 0.5901±0.0956
Daubechies-8 0.0193±0.0082 0.0746±0.0233 0.1322±0.0393 0.2342±0.0556 0.5714±0.0997
Coiflet-6 0.0087±0.0045 0.0381±0.0155 0.0763±0.0271 0.1491±0.0432 0.5203±0.1095
Biorthogonal 6/2 0.0154±0.0066 0.0588±0.0210 0.1095±0.0345 0.1993±0.0533 0.5531±0.1037
GRS4 0.0458±0.0161 0.1395±0.0460 0.2289±0.0775 0.3379±0.1036 0.6537±0.0994
and 7. Analogously, Figures 8 and 9 show the empirical pdfs for the JPEG2000 attack at 0.25 bpp and 2 bpp.
For conciseness, only the empirical pdfs associated to the extremes cases were depicted. Computational
simulations reveal that the empirical pdfs for the intermediate degrees of attack are, in qualitative terms,
proportionally situated in between the discussed extreme cases. Observe that, when an watermark mismatch
occurred (Figures 6(a)-(b) and 7(a)-(b); and Figures 8(a)-(b) and 9(a)-(b)), the empirical pdfs possess
a Gaussian-like shape, indicating a manifestation of the Central Limit Theorem. The Lilliefors test for
normality was applied and Gaussianity hypothesis could not be rejected in all cases, except in the following
few situations: (i) Daubechies-4 and biorthogonal 6/2 wavelets under JPEG attack at Q = 90; (ii) Coiflet-6
wavelet under JPEG attack at Q = 10, and (iii) Daubechies-2 and GRS4 wavelets under JPEG2000 attack at
2 bpp. Nevertheless, even for these cases, the empirical pdfs resemble Gaussian pdfs, indicating an eventual
convergence to normality, if sufficiently many trials were performed.
Table 3: Average and standard deviation of the empirical pdf of ρ for several combinations of wavelets and
JPEG2000 attack strength
Bit Rate (bpp)
Wavelet
0.25 0.5 1.0 2.0
Daubechies-4 0.0275±0.0210 0.0817±0.0682 0.2212±0.1328 0.5559±0.2004
Daubechies-8 0.0207±0.0168 0.0637±0.0473 0.1920±0.1263 0.5261±0.2145
Coiflet-6 0.0167±0.0124 0.0537±0.0370 0.1649±0.0940 0.4870±0.2002
Biorthogonal 6/2 0.0311±0.0321 0.0902±0.0785 0.2384±0.1470 0.5574±0.2159
GRS4 0.0746±0.0618 0.1597±0.1240 0.3259±0.1918 0.6417±0.2251
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Table 4: Threshold values for the detection algorithm
JPEG @ Q = 10 JPEG2000 @ 0.25 bpp
γ 0.340374 1.191534
Table 5: Detection and false alarm ratios
Attack pD pFA
JPEG @ Q = 10 0.9580 0.0089
JPEG2000 @ 0.25 bpp 1.0000 0.0020
Tables 2 and 3 show — for the JPEG and JPEG2000 attack, respectively — the average and the standard
deviation of correlation coefficients. Regardless the conditions, the empirical pdfs related to the non-regular
wavelet GRS4 are in the rightmost locations as they exhibit greater averages.
The GRS4 filter offers the highest correlation coefficients in all scenarios, being followed by the Daubechies-
4 wavelet in the JPEG case and by the biorthogonal 6/2 in the JPEG2000. The GRS4 filter leads to the
highest correlation coefficients because watermarked messages using the GRS4 wavelet domain are more im-
mune to compression due the energy spreading property in the transform domain. Effectively, the watermark
is inserted simultaneously in low and high frequency subbands. Therefore, having in mind the most severe
attacks discussed above, it is accepted that under less severe attacks the detection performance would be
enhanced. Then further analysis focuses mainly the worst case scenario.
Subsequently, the NP criterion was suitably adjusted to handle empirical pdfs instead of analytically
expressed pdfs. Moreover, numerical integration techniques were employed to solve Equation 6 for the
threshold γ [29]. Selecting a probability of false alarm PFA = 10
−2, the Neyman-Pearson approach furnished
the values of γ shown in Table 4.
5 Results and Discussion
To assess the detection performance of the watermarking scheme based on the GRS4 wavelet, the probability
of detection and the probability of false alarm needed to be calculated. By simulating the algorithm a number
of times, the relative frequency of detection pD and false alarm pFA can be used as estimators for the sought
probabilities.
For simulation purposes, only the worst case scenario were taken in consideration, namely JPEG com-
pression for Q = 10 and JPEG2000 compression at 0.25 bpp. Additionally, we considered an entirely new
set of eight images from the USC SIPI database. Otherwise, the use of previously examined images would
introduce bias to the results. This set of images were submitted to the proposed watermarking scheme with
the GRS4 wavelet for 8000 trials. Table 5 shows the obtained relative frequencies.
We argue that the high frequency subbands of regular filters are less resistant to compression because
compression algorithms such as JPEG and JPEG2000 behave as lowpass filters. As a result, watermark
messages that are added to the high frequency subbands are likely be filtered out by compression. On the
other hand, the subbands of non-regular transforms contain all frequency components.
To emphasize this point, the correlation coefficient was computed separately for each subband, considering
regular and non-regular wavelets. Again examining the worst case scenario, we compared, in the JPEG attack
at Q = 10, the results derived from the Daubechies-4 and the GRS4 wavelets. Analogously, for the JPEG2000
10
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Figure 10: Box and whisker plot of ρ for JPEG attack at Q = 10 categorized by subbands.
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Figure 11: Box and whisker plot of ρ for JPEG2000 attack at 0.25 bpp categorized by subbands.
attack at 0.25 bpp, the biorthogonal wavelet was set against the GRS4 wavelet. These particular wavelets
were elected because they granted the largest values of average ρ in their respective empirical pdfs, as shown
in Tables 2 and 3.
As a result, Figures 10 and 11 depict box and whisker plots of ρ categorized by subband. Note that in
all subbands the average value of ρ for the non-regular wavelets is greater than the quantities offered by the
regular wavelets. The correlation coefficients of the LL subbands are generally superior when compared with
other subbands. This result is not surprising as most of the energy is concentrated in the LL subband. More
than that, when non-regular wavelets are utilized, the variance of the average ρ throughout the subbands
are considerably lower when compared with the regular wavelets. This indicates that the information stored
in the higher subbands is significant for watermarking detection when non-regular wavelet are employed.
Computational evidence also demonstrates that the above discussed behavior remains valid for the other
values of quality factor and bit rate considered in this work.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper non-regular wavelet filters are shown to have useful properties for image watermarking. These
filters provide energy spreading. As a result, at the same time image quality is high and the watermark is
very robust to lossy operations furnished by the JPEG and JPEG2000 compression schemes.
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